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1. Introduction 
Identity politics based on ethnic or religious identification, cultural habits or national-
ity are becoming increasingly important when it comes to the mobilization of move-
ments, electorate, e-mail protests, transnational cooperation, and migrants’ networks. 
Countries are promised spiritual and political “healing” by religious presidential candi-
dates, presidents are being elected because of their ethnic bloodline or religious creed, 
wars are being waged to achieve ethnic or religious “cleansing,” and actors establish 
transnational cooperation simply on the basis of belonging to the same religious de-
nomination or the same ethnic “people.” According to a strong line of research, “iden-
tity politics” is the way in which social movements—ethnic, religious, gender-related 
or otherwise culturally based—weave transnational relations and become involved in 
politics to expand their identity claims. Such identity politics imply the scientific 
task—as Christian Büschges and Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka put it (12)—of capturing the 
practical logics of:  
a. the “change in semantics and models of argumentation and legitimation,” 
b. putting identity based action “on the political agenda,”  
c. the “main actors and media as well as the actors’ strategies of reinterpreting the 
political realm” and of positioning themselves within it.  
Given that for identity politics symbolic operations and relations of recognition are as 
important as material resources and power “quota,” it is helpful to approach them 
within a framework of a social theory capable of “understanding” (“Verstehen,” Max 
Weber) actors and their actions in their socio-structural framework. 
Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory provides such an approach. As identity politics 
spawn their special dynamics, it seems to be worthwhile to ask if Bourdieu’s concept 
of “field” allows capturing these dynamics and constructing a “field of identity pol-
itics.” In this essay I will focus on this question and suggest a combination of three 
models as an approach to the analysis of identity politics and as a step toward the 
construction of a field of identity politics. These models are models in the strict sense 
of the word. They help to organize and structure observational data, each under a 
clearly defined but therefore very limited aspect. A model has to be economical and 
frugal; it cannot explain all relevant aspects of social praxis at once. The aspects that 
each model contributes to the understanding of social praxis can be combined in their 
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interpretation. Before outlining the models, however, the approach of our team at 
Bielefeld University requires a brief clarification of four basic terms: “field,” “iden-
tity,” “politics,” and “identity politics.” 
2. The Basic Terms 
2.1. Field 
When a German hears the word “Feld” (field), the association of a soccer field, a sta-
dium, is often evoked. In that context, the “field” is clearly defined by lines on the 
grass, goal posts, corner flags, and so forth; it is surrounded by a huge concrete struc-
ture, gates, watchmen etc. This kind of field appears to be a “system”—maybe of Luh-
mannean nature—rather than a “field” according to Pierre Bourdieu.  
To form an idea of a field according to Bourdieu, remember your youth: a small 
street in your neighborhood or a meadow behind the grocery store, some boys, maybe 
some girls, too; a ball tossed on the ground and everybody running after it, knowing 
intimately the nomos—the rules—of the game: “get the ball and shoot a goal,” and 
sharing the belief (the doxa) of all players that the game is worthwhile. Everybody 
invests the force of his or her body into the game according to its best sense for the 
game, pursuing the interest to manage the ball. Quickly, the ball is kicked back and 
forth, two teams begin to gather. Somebody sets down a stone, another one a sweater, 
and there is a goalpost; and then shortly afterwards, a second goal is created, with 
another goalkeeper. The dimensions of the game are taking shape. The individual 
interest transforms into the common interest to help the team win by scoring goals. 
Over time, differences in velocity and skill (the means of production) as well as in the 
previously acquired capital (experience and reputation gained in former games) will 
generate the different positions of the players and the teams. Some are experienced and 
strong players, arrivée in the field, some are unskilled newcomers. And finally, one 
team will win. And maybe a few days later the team will compete against another 
neighborhood team. This is how a field emerges.  
This example illustrates some basic facts about Bourdieu’s theory. First, the field 
theory is actor-oriented, but not individualistic. It does not comprise “fields” as fixed 
structures or even systems.1 If we want to work with it, it makes sense to begin with 
the actors, their interests, their dispositions, their sense of the game, their doxa and 
their capital, in order to understand the nomos (the regulating principle) of a certain 
game.  
Second, fields are not preexistent or independent of social activity. They are sci-
entific constructions to better understand social praxis. There is no political or eco-
nomic field with essentially fixed attributes. Praxis itself is fuzzy; economic, religious, 
                                                
1  Cf. Bourdieu/Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 102, where Bourdieu stresses 
the differences between his theory of fields and Luhmann’s Systems Theory.  
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political, ethnic, gender-related, and other interests intermix over and over again. A 
model provides two benefits: it helps to describe regularities and, even more impor-
tantly, it constructs a theoretical framework for the object of study. A theoretical mod-
el of a field, thus, establishes artificial boundaries which turn the fuzzy movements of 
praxis into something describable and which serve as common criteria of description 
—a benefit for a large group of scholars trying to shed light on “identity politics.” 
Third, Bourdieu’s concepts of “field,” “space,” and “habitus” are not simply met-
aphors even though they are often used as such in literature. Look at Bourdieu’s 
Distinction for the term of “social space,” at The Rules of Art for “field,” or at Outline 
of a Theory of Practice for “habitus”—you won’t find metaphors used for modelling 
social praxis but instead scientific terms. The metaphorical usage—for whatever 
reasons, maybe often simply for a “Bourdieu light”-feeling—gives up the benefits of a 
rather precise scientific vocabulary.  
Fourth, Bourdieu’s concepts of “field” and “habitus” are intimately intercon-
nected, not least by doxa as their common link. This means that the objectivistic per-
spective on the relations between actors in a constructed field can easily be related to 
these actors’ practical logic and their dispositions; ultimately, to their identity. Thus, 
there is a chance to understand precisely the cultural production of the actors as 
identity based strategies that contribute to the emergence of what we sociologically 
capture as the political field and might even, in the future, be able to model as a field 
of identity politics.  
2.2. Identity 
In the context of identity, a German thinks, most probably, first of a “normal” German. 
The ordinary “man on the street” might not catch the observer’s eye. Nevertheless, that 
man has a habitus and an identity: stereotypically, one might think that he grew up in a 
grey neighborhood (perhaps even without soccer), had no real conflict with his father, 
received a mediocre education at school, and his greatest achievement was getting a 
boring job. His habitus—as Bourdieu would call it—of mediocrity simply evolved as 
it did. Still, he experiences his own convictions in his day-by-day praxis as individual, 
very much his own; he would not consider the ascriptions to him that others may make 
as delimiting his identity. On the other hand, foreigners thinking about German iden-
tity will probably imagine a typical German in a different way. They might find those 
“typical Germans” at the “Oktoberfest” (October festival) in Munich, dressed in tradi-
tional Bavarian attire. These “traditional Germans,” in turn, know about the ascriptions 
foreigners make and, in consequence, might expose their otherness. Even though the 
identities of these actors are based in their habitus, too, the difference to the epitome of 
the mediocre person previously mentioned is that due to their relations to foreigners 
and their ascriptions these actors tend to highlight certain traits of their habitus—
according to the special field condition of the October festival—creating a cultural 
identity that can be useful, for example, in business. 
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This little stroll through German landscapes showed that identities have two as-
pects, as Frederik Barth has put it in his later work:2 marked difference against others 
which defines the group as “us” against “them” (form) and certain cognitive, affective 
and in many cases even bodily traits common to the members of a given collective 
(content). Identity is constructed neither through cognitive contents alone, nor by 
simply distinguishing “us” from “them.” To understand an actor’s identity, the mutual 
influence between contents—e.g. convictions—and difference (or boundaries) is the 
clue. Experiences of distinctions and differences are basic in any process of growing 
up, as Piaget reminds us. But these notions become part of our cognitive dispositions 
as cognitive content. As such they will guide future experiences of difference; and—at 
the same time—they will be re-modified by such experiences; then they will put forth, 
again, further perception, judgment and action. This is how Bourdieu (in Outline of a 
Theory of Practice and Distinction) characterizes habitus as a set of dispositions and 
as operating in the actor’s practical logic. A concept of identity can be construed on 
this base, though Bourdieu himself did not elaborate on this particular issue. The 
actor—for instance, the Bavarian at the “Oktoberfest”—experiences in the encounter 
with his “life world”—family, neighbors, competitors, foreigners and so forth—that 
some of his cultural dispositions slip into the focus of his own practical attention more 
than others.3 Thus, going a small step beyond Bourdieu, we can define identity as such 
dispositions of the actor’s habitus that are explicitly (“consciously”) practiced by the 
actor and perceived by others. Consequently, we can think of identities as loosely 
woven, flexible, ever changing but, at the same time, practically coherent networks of 
dispositions (cf. Schäfer, “Network Identity;” Theorie). 
The network model of identity possesses the following characteristics: First, it 
allows for a better understanding of “hybridity” and “creolization,” of “fluid,” “patch-
work” or “multiphrenic” identities. Second, such a model enables the researcher to in-
terpret—disregarding specific individual and/or collective actors—discourses, works 
of art, film, literature, music, religious rites, ethnic outfits or other cultural products as 
elements (strong or weak, central or peripheral) of the cognitive, emotional and bodily 
identity-networks of the given actors. Third, the researcher can also understand those 
cultural products as representational signs and symbols, as practical instruments of an 
actor’s strategies (cf. Wittgenstein) and, finally, as elements of the actor’s self-descrip-
                                                
2  In his classic study on identity (Ethnic Groups and Boundaries) Barth opposes older essen-
tialist theories of identity through a concept focused in difference (‘boundaries’). Later on 
(in “Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity”), he stated that cognitive 
content is needed in order to construct identities. 
3  This focus related not only to “consciousness;” that term—through the opposition of con-
scious (rational, clear) vs. unconscious (or subconscious: irrational?, unclear)—prevents 
understanding an important characteristic of habitus and practical logic, which is: both are 
operating implicitly and explicitly—as Bourdieu says—at the same time (cf. Schäfer, Zur 
Theorie von kollektiver Identität und Habitus 273, 344; and Schäfer, Identität als Netz-
werk).  
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tion in terms of identity. These aspects of a habitus-based theory of identity must be 
distinguished analytically.  
It is important for the quest of identity politics that the network model of identity 
is closely combined with Bourdieu’s models of social space and of fields. Thus, it al-
lows modelling a close linkage between the identities of actors and the conditions in 
which they act, the field.  
In more detail, this means the following: First, it is possible to use the study of 
almost every cultural product and practice—from movies and novels, to religious rites 
and interviews—to describe the networks of dispositions that shape a given (collective 
or individual) actor’s identity. Thus, the researcher can grasp the identities at stake 
according to their contents and their specific ways of tracing boundaries. In other 
words: this step highlights the subjective aspect of identity politics. The following 
steps model the objective conditions of identity politics. Second, on the basis of some 
general demographic data (e.g., income and education) the actors can be located within 
the framework of their social space—the most general model to describe the distri-
bution of social and objective possibilities for action. Third, a more specific position-
ing of the actors can be achieved by locating them in a model of the political field, 
showing the opportunities for generating political effect that emerge from the 
investment of identity capital (e.g. ethnic music, religious campaigns etc.). Fourth, the 
embodied capabilities and the recognized cultural products of a given actor can be 
conceived of as political capital enabling certain political strategies. The distinction of 
different types of strategies, thus, allows for a differential view of the political field 
according to the dimensions of market-oriented policies versus identity policies. 	  
This combination of micro-, meso- and macro-level approaches helps to maintain 
a close link between (subjective) identities and (objective) conditions of action. Never-
theless, it is important to consider that a given cultural identity in the daily routines is 
different from the same identity in a political contention. Cultural identities have to be 
publicly mobilized and thus become more specific, more focused, more pronounced in 
order to operate in identity politics. 
2.3.  Politics 
When Germans think of politics they might have splendid dreams or nightmares—in 
any case, they usually think of an established, formal, procedural and highly structured 
democratic system. A class of political specialists make up an old and autonomous 
political field, upon which laypeople exert a certain, albeit minimal, influence on elec-
tion day. For official politics the formal “vestment” by an office is most important; 
Bourdieu speaks of investiture. With identity politics, however, different actors form 
civil society can appear on the political scene: the Neo-Nazi mobilization is one exam-
ple.  
Approaching cultural identity politics in the Americas at present means dealing 
with a great number of new actors in the political field, in addition to established ones, 
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such as the Catholic Church: ethnic movements, migrants’ organizations, Protestant 
(mostly Pentecostal) churches, women’s organizations etc. These groups enter the 
political field as actors, albeit with still quite “fluid,” unstable and changing identities 
when compared to long-standing official actors. The new movements and their repre-
sentatives exert a measurable effect on official politics, as can be seen, for example, in 
the election of indigenous presidents. They can be legitimately dealt with as actors in 
the political field, employing the specific political style of “identity politics.” As long 
as they employ peaceful means, movement actors achieve their political aims by 
mobilizing people for those aims. This means that they rely on reputation, in the 
double sense of the term: they need to be known and to be appreciated. Reputation is 
one of the dimensions of the political field, according to Bourdieu. This means, for 
now, that we can construct the political field according to established criteria and deal 
with the specificities of identity politics within that framework.  
2.4.  Identity Politics 
The literature on identity politics is rapidly increasing. This essay will focus briefly on 
two issues which have recently inspired research. 
First, the distinction between “identity politics” and “interest politics” (cf., e.g., 
Goldstein/Rayner; Rothman/Olson) helps to separate different political strategies—not 
goals. It can be useful for a heuristic model to locate and describe different styles of 
political strategies. Nevertheless, we need to make a small terminological adjustment. 
The term “interest” is too broad if it is not limited to the framework of rational choice. 
In general, “interest” refers to identity-based styles of politics, since these are inter-
ested in fostering the position of their specific group of reference. The authors listed 
above refer to “interest” in a much more specific sense, however. They use “interest” 
for (negotiable) material goods, which are distinct from (not negotiable) identity. Thus, 
the term “interest” is limited—as I will define it below—to market opportunities. On 
the one hand “interest,” in this sense, is focused on “having,” while identity is focused 
on “being.” On the other hand, I suggest that the term “interest” should not be used 
only in this limited sense. For the time being, I will therefore use the term “interest” as 
“material interest” in order to distinguish it from identity politics.  
Second, the use of signs, symbols, art, religious rituals etc. is an important issue 
in the research of cultural identity politics. The most important effect of signs (and 
therefore of meaning) in identity politics relies on the specific social use of signs and 
meaning. Signs—according to a Wittgensteinean and a Pragmatic understanding—are 
not simply representations. They are tools that exert an effect in human praxis because 
practices have a dimension of meaning and exert “symbolic” effects on actors. Signs 
and practices, thus, can acquire the function of “practical metaphors” (Bourdieu). A 
metaphor, in literary studies, is conceived of as linking different levels (“realms,” “do-
mains”) of meaning. For a Bourdieu-style sociology—and in identity politics—practi-
cal metaphors connect different fields of praxis. Thus, they contribute to the con-
Identity Politics and the Political Field 381 
version of capital between different fields. For example, religious metaphors (“healing 
the nation,” “spiritual warfare”) can convert the exclusively religious reputation of a 
certain movement or of an individual into a reputation in the political field, fostering, 
e.g., an electoral campaign. Thus, practical metaphors are important instruments for 
the mobilization of cultural (religious, ethnic etc.) actors in favor of a certain political 
goal. Inversely, this means for the study of discourse, literature, film, rites etc. that 
from the perspective of identity politics these artifacts and practices are most inter-
esting in their function as practical metaphors; in other words: as operators of power 
within the constellations of the political field.  
A third point I would like to make here might seem to be a little anachronistic in 
post-post-modern times—in neoliberal times, maybe it is not. The point is that “money 
makes the world go round,” or more precisely: money and the knowledge of its use. 
As for understanding identity politics and politics in general, it is important to know 
where in the overall space of social power a given political actor is located. It matters 
whether a collective actor is poor and lacks technological knowledge or if he or she is 
middle class and intellectual. Therefore, as already mentioned above, a promising 
objectivistic step of analysis is to pinpoint the relevant actors (according to some basic 
demographic data) in a model of the social space. 
3. The Social Space of Political Styles 
The following model is easy to explain. It is very similar to Bourdieu’s model of the 
social space developed in La distinction. I have adapted this model during the 
nineteen-eighties to religious actors, obtaining a “social space of religious styles.” Our 
research team at Bielefeld University has developed a means of statistical measure-
ment of economic and cultural capital. In a similar way, this model can be applied to 
political actors, for whom it would show a “social space of political styles.” To 
exemplify this, in the following I will draw on my research data from Guatemala and 
on Andrea Althoff’s4 excellent dissertation on ethnicity and religion in Guatemala.  
The vertical axis of the model (fig. 1) represents the aggregation of economic and 
cultural capital (simply measured by income and education).5 Positions in the upper 
scales enjoy much of both, income and (formal) education. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the two forms of capital in opposition to one another (plotted A against B). On 
the right, there is relatively more economic capital than cultural capital; on the left it is 
the other way round. This means that the positions that have the same level on the 
                                                
4  Andrea Althoff, Divided by Faith and Ethnicity: Religious Pluralism and the Problem of 
Race in Guatemala. Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2014.  
5  The original idea in Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste is 
that the vertical axis represents all of the capital accumulated by given actors. But this is 
too complex to measure, even for Bourdieu. An economical design with only income and 
education as the forms of capital employed is easier to handle and facilitates international 
comparison.  
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vertical scale can be differentiated, on the horizontal scale, according to the structure 
(or: composition) of their capital. This marks important differences between social 
positions that—through a simple distinction between rich and poor—might be esti-
mated as equal. The idea is quickly evident if one examines the different professional 
groupings in the model: e.g., “industrialists” compared to “large landowners” or “small 
peasants” compared to “industrial labor.” This structure is a frame to pinpoint the 
relevant actors of identity politics according to their position within the general distri-
bution of capital in society. This is possible because any “identity movement”—like 
any other social actor—possesses a certain amount of economic and cultural capital. 
This capital can be measured (or estimated) and thus serve to locate the movement in 
question in relation to other social actors within the model of the social space.  
Agg reg ated economic	  
and cultural	  capital +
Social space of	  political styles
Guatemala	  apr.	  1990
Vertical = 	  overall volume
of	  capital:	  sum of	  the two
aggregated forms of	  
capital.	  
Horizontal = 	  Structure
of	  capital:	  volumes of	  
capital in	  inverse relation.
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  cap.	  + 	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  cap.	  	  –
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“Old” Military
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  +
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and cultural	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Mayan ethnic movement
national ethnic representation
Neo-pentecostals
liberal transnationalism
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Figure 1: The Social Space of Political Styles 
In our graph (fig. 1) we limit ourselves to three significant Guatemalan actors: 
indigenous Pentecostals, Maya intellectuals, and Neo-Pentecostals6 (cf. Althoff). Later 
on, I will give more details on their praxis. Now, their location in the social space is of 
                                                
6  The concept of “Neo-Pentecostalism” refers to a certain section of the Pentecostal move-
ment. It split from “classical” Pentecostalism in the U.S.A. during the 1950s, expanded to 
established Protestant and Catholic churches and developed a large number of independent 
“ministries.” Its most important distinction from “classical” Pentecostalism is that from its 
beginning it has been a middle and upper middle class movement with more action-
oriented religious beliefs and with quite clear-cut conservative social and political strate-
gies.  
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primary interest. We see that the indigenous Pentecostals are associated with a low so-
cial position with relatively little cultural capital: the small traditional peasantry. The 
Maya intellectuals appear to be a movement of the middle class. And, finally, the Gua-
temalan Neo-Pentecostals are located in the upwardly mobile, educated upper middle 
class. Any of these clusters practices a certain style of identity politics, of course relat-
ed to the overall size and structure of capital it disposes of: the indigenous Pentecostals 
are oriented locally and in their immediate ‘life world’ (Schütz); the Mayan intel-
lectuals have ethnically defined goals for the nation and dispose of some transnational 
linkage; the Neo-Pentecostals are religiously anti-ethnic and pursue nationalistic and 
Western civilizational goals. The model of the “social space of identity politics” makes 
it possible to estimate how any of these styles are linked to an objective position with-
in the distribution of overall social power. In other words, it shows to what extent a 
certain identity movement can also be interpreted as a “class movement.” The position 
of an actor in the social space (“class”) exerts an important influence upon his or her 
possibilities to pursue his or her identity goals effectively and mobilize the public 
accordingly. But the position in the social space is not the only external condition 
needed for effective identity politics. The relations of power are likewise very impor-
tant in the field of (identity) politics. 
4. Tools for Field Construction 
In order to construct a model of a field—the political field in general or the field of 
identity politics—it is necessary at this point to sketch some theoretical baselines. Our 
group of researchers draws upon the approach put forth by Bourdieu in The Rules of 
Art.7 But we designed the model in a more abstract way in order to be able to measure 
more easily and to avoid reification.8 Leif Seibert was first in developing such a model 
for the religious field. We draw here upon his general observations on constructing 
field models. 
Additionally, it is helpful to establish some orientation on the use of Bourdieu’s 
vocabulary concerning the theory of fields in general. Bourdieu employs a certain set 
of categories in order to construct multiple aspects of the struggle that takes place in 
diverse fields of social praxis. He uses some of these categories in a constant and 
stable way; other concepts undergo changes or are being used less frequently. This 
method corresponds to Bourdieu’s idea of theory as a toolkit for empirical research. It 
                                                
7  Cf. The Rules of Art and “The Field of Cultural Production or the Economic World Re-
versed.” See footnote 1 for our research process. 
8  A term like “sub-field” suggests that a field is a given entity in reality, a part of which can 
be conceived of as a second, subordinated entity. Bourdieu himself, with a constructivist 
impetus, argues very strongly against reification of models; but he triggers this misunder-
standing by using terms like “sub-field.” The positioning of the field of art within the field 
of power (cf. “The Field of Cultural Production or the Economic World Reversed” 319) 
can also be misunderstood in an essentialist way.  
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is this understanding—and not scholastics—that taught our team to use a list of terms 
as a box of heuristic tools for the construction of the field. We “distilled” such a list 
from Bourdieu’s writings by elaborating definitions of the most important categories 
and determining their equivalents in different fields.9 The categories are intended to 
facilitate empirical observation and to provide further possibilities for conceptualizing 
identity politics according to the Bourdieu’s framework. The following terms were the 
most significant to us: 
Nomos means the central objective principle of praxis of a certain field. In the 
capitalist economic field this would be “profit,” “l’art pour l’art” in the field of arts, 
and “domination” in politics.  
Doxa are the subjective aspects that actors derive from the nomos. Thus, doxa 
refer(s) to a habitus that corresponds to the given field. In the field of arts it would be 
“beauty,” in politics the self-ascribed “right to dominate” and in economy it would be 
the right to “make profit.” In relation to the doxa of a field, actors can position them-
selves in different ways. They can be orthodox and maintain a position of power in the 
field (e.g., the “priest”), codifying and enforcing a conservative interpretation of doxa; 
they also can be heterodox and in opposition (e.g., the “prophet”), mobilizing against 
orthodoxy; and, finally, they can be allodox (e.g., the “sorcerer”) and exert in a sub-
ordinate position some doxa-like practices on the margin of the field, without an ex-
plicit interest in dominating the field.  
Actors in a field are those groups and individuals whose action exerts an effect 
on the field according to its nomos. Actors are specialists in the respective mode of 
production and compete with other specialists in the field for favorable positions with-
in the field. Bystanders are not actors; but the public can be mobilized and enter the 
field with temporary (a revolt) or with lasting (a revolution) effects. In economy, 
actors are investors, in politics they are all spokespersons, and in religion typical actors 
are the priest, the prophet and the sorcerer. They act according to their sense of the 
game. 
                                                
9  Bourdieu “The Field of Cultural Production or the Economic World Reversed,” The Rules 
of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, “How Can ‘Free-floating Intellectuals’ 
Be Set Free?,” “Some Properties of Fields,” “The Linguistic Market,” “Rethinking the 
State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” “The New Capital,” Practical 
Reason: On the Theory of Action, “Pour une science des œuvres,” “The Intellectual Field: 
A World Apart,” The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, 
“Conférence: Le champ politique,” Distinction: A social Critique of the Judgement of 
Taste, “Espace social et champ politique,” “Monopolisation politique et révolutions 
symboliques,” “A Lecture on the Lecture;” Bourdieu and Fritsch, “Entretien: Pierre 
Bourdieu avec Philippe Fritsch.” Bourdieu’s Homo academicus (chapter 3) shows how 
Bourdieu works very freely and interchangeably with the notions of “field” and “space” 
and that both terms always are understood according to power relations. We did not 
include this chapter into our analysis, but take it as a warning not to “sclerotify” 
Bourdieu’s tools into something like orthodoxy. 
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Sense of the game is the ability to understand and feel what the game is about and 
how it works, based on habitus and, thus, experiences in the field. This dispositional 
calibration of the actor and the field can be called the sense of business in economy, 
the aesthetic sense in the arts, the sense (or feeling) for power in politics and the sense 
for the holy or sacred in religion.  
Resources are mobilized according to the sense of the game and the states of 
fluctuations (conjuncture) of the field. Resources are material, cognitive, bodily or 
other goods at the disposition of given actors that can be mobilized for the struggles in 
the field. The economic resource is money, an artistic resource might be originality 
(“genius,” according to Kant), and political resources are political knowledge and 
spare time.  
Stakes are resources actually used, invested goods that are put at risk and that can 
be lost in the game. They are at the same time subjective and objective. In economy, 
investments are a stake. In politics, a stake is often an “idée force,” a basic distinction 
with the power to mobilize masses: the rich against the poor, the French against the 
Africans etc. If it does not work, it is lost. Subjectively, the actor is affected since he 
ties to his stakes his own illusion, the emotional and cognitive involvement in the game.  
Means of production are what the actors can use in a specific field in order to 
produce. In economy, these are skills and investment goods; in politics, competence, 
mandate and broadcasting.  
The product is the result of the processes of production and exchange in a field. 
In economy, these are commodities; in the arts, the individual work of art, and in 
politics, the statements.  
Capital is the result of field-specific production, which is best suited to be rein-
vested in further accumulation. In economy this is, simply, money; in the arts it seems 
to be the reputation that stems from a successful work of art; in politics, most 
probably, it is prestige. Capital circulates in the processes of production and exchange 
within a given field. 
Exchange in a field converts the specific products of the field into relative values 
according to the distinct worth of the products for varied actors in the field (thus, gen-
erating exchangeable value). The processes of exchange in the diverse fields of praxis 
are not limited to economic modes of exchange, but also include ritualized (gifts) and 
symbolic (honor) modes. In economics, exchange takes place as trade and acquisition; 
in the arts, as trade, exposition and reputation; in politics, as representation and delega-
tion within the framework of political institutions and of institutionalized public (vot-
ers).  
Profit is the surplus value produced by any investment (work, investment goods 
etc.),10 and it is put at stake in the production and exchange of a specific field. In the 
                                                
10  As far as we can see, Bourdieu’s concept of “profit” is not as specific as the one used by 
Marx, who defines profit as the surplus generated by human labour as opposed to invest-
ment goods.  
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economic field, this is, again, money; in the arts, it is reputation; and in politics, it is 
the mobilization of approval and thus, in the long run, a stronger domination of the field.  
Dimensions of a field—as we have seen above—can be constructed according to 
the two abstract terms of achievement and autonomy. Achievement refers to the estab-
lishment of actors in the field and of the field itself. In economy, we take achievement 
to mean wealth; in the arts, Bourdieu identifies it as consecration (subjective) and as 
the academies, i.e., as institutions (objective); in politics, achievement equals political 
office (“investiture”). Autonomy refers to the degree to which an actor is free of com-
promise from outside in a given field and acts according to the field’s premises (its 
nomos). For the field of the arts, Bourdieu defines autonomy as being guided by the 
principle of “l’art pour l’art” and compromise as being guided by economic interests 
and the public. For politics, we define autonomy as the integrity of a political actor in 
correspondence with his/her reputation among the public. 
The state of fluctuation (“conjuncture”) of a field is a conditioning factor for 
almost all processes in the field. It influences the chances of production and exchange 
and is defined as the state of power relations between the different actors of the field in 
a given situation in time. The conjuncture depends on internal as well as on external 
factors. For the economy, we identify it as the conditions for investments; for the arts, 
it is the changing fashions; for the political field, we define it as the current debates 
and election campaigns.  
Compromise means external influences on the field contrary to its nomos, distort-
ing its internal relations of power and its dynamics of reproduction. In the economy, 
this is morals and politics regulating the logic of the free market forces; in the arts, 
Bourdieu defines it as commerce; and in politics, compromise mostly occurs through 
scandals and corruption.  
External relations of a field relate the specialists (who make up the field), first, to 
the relevant “lay people” and, second, to other fields relevant for the reproduction of 
the field in question. The external relation to lay people is important for politics and 
religion, since these specialists depend very much on their capacity to mobilize people. 
This is especially the case under conditions of democracy and a relatively free “reli-
gious market”—while dictatorship integrates the military into politics and official 
religions involve politics. In the economy, typical external relations are law and pro-
fessional education; in the field of arts, external relations include taste, patronage, and 
political change; in politics, some typical external relations are elections, journalistic 
coverage and polls.  
The external relations of the political field are particularly important for identity 
politics, since these are developing on the “public fringe” of the field. They employ 
different means of production in order to politicize cultural products. Thus, they 
become a symbolic means of political mobilization and of exerting effects on the pow-
er relations of the political field. It is important to note that the strategies of identity 
politics are tied up with cultural habitus and the corresponding practical logics. They 
transform cultural products creatively into political statements. Thus they create and 
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foster unorthodox political actors who employ identity as their specific resource in 
politics.  
5. Identity Politics in the Political Field  
Our research group has invested some time into constructing what might be called a 
specific “field of identity politics.” However, in the meantime we have become 
somewhat reluctant to do so for two reasons. First, we feel that we need some more 
empirical research on the dynamics of identity politics to determine the specific di-
mensions, capital, exchange processes etc. of this field. Second, we think that, for now, 
a recommendable approach to such empirical data is understanding identity politics as 
a specific way of doing politics in distinction to other forms. As we neither want to use 
the term “field” only in a metaphorical way nor invent something like a “subfield” of 
politics, we simply opt for constructing general models of the political field and the 
relevant strategies while taking into account the actors and dynamics of identity 
politics. For the time being, we base this decision on the following consideration: the 
political significance of identity relies on the fact that it is a kind of politics. Hence 
specificity can best be understood when identity politics are shown in their practical 
difference(s) to other kinds of politics. 
The intentions of our model of the political field are quite similar to those of the 
social space model. It relates actors to one another. But as a model of a field, it relates 
actors according to the special conditions of that specific game, in our case the 
political one.11 This is to say that the actors of identity politics appear within the power 
relations of general politics. In order to understand the specific kinds of logic that fa-
cilitate the mobilization through identity issues better, our second model—the model 
of political strategies—allows to specify what can be visualized in the model of the po-
litical field. Thus, the model of strategies—interest versus identity—will be, for now, 
the last step of our deliberations. We hope, however, that these models mark helpful 
steps towards a construction of a model for a field of identity politics.  
In the political field, like in a soccer game, actors invest their skills and assets in 
order to achieve a dominant position. From this position12 they dominate society 
through political means. In order to participate in the political game, it is necessary to 
become politically mobilized and exert an effect on other political actors. Doing so 
means participation in the field. Actors without political effects are not part of the 
field. The nomos of the field is that actors struggle for dominance. The term 
                                                
11  In methodological terms, it relates the actors to the dimensions of the model and, in conse-
quence, to one another according to the specific perspective of the model. 
12  We distinguish between “power” and “domination/dominance” in the way proposed by 
Weber (Economy and Society). “Power” means the ability to impose one’s will on others 
and is associated with force, while “domination” means power based on recognition by the 
dominated.  
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“domination” (and derivates) is understood as the recognized ability of a given actor to 
impose his/her will on other actors.13 The belief of the actors—their doxa that enables 
them to participate in the game—is that they feel entitled to dominate the field. 
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Figure 2: The Political Field  
As we hope to capture some important aspects of these relations in a model, we first 
have to name the dimensions of the field at stake.  
Bourdieu proposes to construct the field of art according to two dimensions that 
find analogies in his writings on politics and seem useful to us for constructing a mod-
el of the political field, too: 
1. the degree of achievement (or success, “être arrivé”) of the participating actors 
in the field;  
2. I the degree of autonomy against compromising influences from outside the 
field; that is to say, the degree of sovereignty to obey exclusively the nomos of 
the field—in our case the struggle for dominance.  
Following Bourdieu except for a small alteration, we project the scale for 
achievement vertically and the scale for autonomy horizontally.14 
                                                
13  Here we differ from Bourdieu, who locates the nomos of the political field in the struggle 
for power. As we distinguish between power and domination, we can associate these 
different concepts with different degrees of autonomy among political actors; see below.  
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Then we identify “autonomy” within the political field as equivalent to integrity 
and (professional) reputation. In this sense, an autonomous politician is one who can 
act independently on the basis of his or her reputation. This concept correlates posi-
tively (and not negatively as in Bourdieu’s model of the field of art) with “public repu-
tation.” The two axes describe the dimensions of the field.  
Dimensions of a field describe the frame within which the struggles for the 
field’s profit take place. The two formal criteria introduced by Bourdieu to trace the 
dimensions of the field of art are useful for the construction of other fields, as well.15 
The dimension of achievement reflects the degree of establishment of a given actor 
within the field and, ultimately, the degree of establishment and stability of the field 
itself. Achievement connotes practice and the existence of a field-specific order: long-
standing actors versus novices, and—to a certain degree co-dependently—a strong 
institutionalization in old fields versus weak institutions in new fields. In our model of 
the political field, we code achievement as the authority of political office (investi-
ture). The dimension of autonomy or—inversely—compromise reflects the degree to 
which an actor acts according to the nomos of the field or is compromised or corrupted 
by external factors. For the field of the arts, Bourdieu defines the autonomy of an actor 
as being guided by the principle of “l’art pour l’art” and compromise as being guided 
by economic interests and the public. In the field of politics under democratic con-
ditions (or at least aspirations), the role of the public is different: the public contributes 
to the legitimacy and efficacy of domination by recognizing it. Therefore, we decided 
to follow the route that Leif Seibert traced for the religious field: we construct the axis 
of autonomy “positively,” that is, focused on the integrity of an actor in correspon-
dence with public reputation.  
This mode of construction is based on the decision to introduce some differentia-
tion into the concept of political power. Bourdieu’s term of power is a generic one that 
encompasses domination (or dominance) and coercion (or force). According to Max 
Weber, however, power is defined as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless 
of the basis on which this probability rests” (53).  
The concept of domination is more specific in the sense that it presupposes a 
consent with the relation of dominance that “implies a minimum of voluntary com-
pliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in 
                                                                                                                                                   
14  We do not reproduce the negative correlation between public reputation and reputation 
within the field of the arts. The artistic field, as analyzed by Bourdieu, obeys the logic of 
l’art pour l’art and keeps its distance from the tastes of the “man on the street.” Now, 
constructing the political field in the same way would systematically establish a negative 
correlation between the logics of politics and pubic reputation. This is problematic under 
conditions of a widespread plausibility of democratic order or, at least, of some kind of 
popular representation. 
15  On the construction of the religious field, cf. Seibert, “Glaubwürdigkeit als religiöses Ver-
mögen.” 
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obedience” (Weber 212). Consent is important, since it allows both to conceive of cul-
tural production in an intimate relation to the maintaining of political power and to 
challenge it (thus calling to mind Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘his-
torical bloc’). From the concept of domination by consent we can draw a line to the 
other end of the continuum: power by means of coercion or force. Where there is no 
chance to base power relations on consent, coercion by menace or the implementation 
of violence replace consent. (In Gramsci, for this reason, coercive regimes represent a 
crisis of hegemony.) This means for our model that we are more specific on the nomos 
of the field and on its profit. We implement the concept of domination instead of the 
concept of power and define the nomos as a struggle for dominance, while we take 
profit to signify simply domination.  
The degrees of authority through integrity, on the one hand, and authority of of-
fice, on the other hand, mark the social coordinates within which the actors (any kind 
of spokespersons) mobilize their resources (spare time and knowledge) to produce 
statements or opinions according to the states of fluctuations (conjunctures) of the 
field (ongoing debates, elections, demonstrations, revolts etc.) and put them as mobil-
izing ideas (idées forces, semantic distinctions with the power to convince) at stake in 
the struggle for the profit of the field, which is political domination.  
Domination, then, is the best position in the field and correlates with high 
achievement and high political autonomy of the respective actors—although it is by 
definition dependent on public reputation.  
Coercion is a technique in political relations; combined with high achievement, it 
is understood as a sign of heteronomy of the respective actors. In the case of military 
dictatorship, for example, the group in power is not able to manage a “crisis of 
hegemony” (Gramsci) through political means and, therefore, recurs to military force 
—compromising the political field and their own autonomy and integrity. Conse-
quently, the diagonal between the axes (see arrow in fig. 2) represents the increase of 
domination over the field as a result of successfully participating in its struggles. The 
dominant position in the field (upper right corner) is the one that combines high office 
with high reputation within the field. High institutional power with low reputation (the 
upper left corner) makes use of coercion without social consent, thus relying very 
much on repression, the military, and capital. Positions of low achievement are situ-
ated near the bottom line of the model. They can also be differentiated according to 
their autonomy (or integrity). Thus, the strongest potential for mobilization and creat-
ing new movement actors in the political field is located in the lower right corner. This 
potential depends on the ability of political actors to mobilize non-political actors (the 
public) for politically relevant action and thus to enter the political field. The public 
recognition of an actor and his or her goals operates on the fringe of the field and 
allows fostering the actor’s position in the field. Inversely, the political field is also 
prone to being compromised by corruption, violence etc. This is to say that external 
factors are quite important for the development of the political field. We therefore 
establish two external factors: public recognition works according to the logic of the 
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field and shapes domination by conveying legitimacy to the government or by 
changing the government through political means. Compromise—in many cases 
corruption—interferes into the political field through non-political means and alters 
the relations of power.  
To return to our Guatemalan example: Indigenous Pentecostals have a certain 
power of mobilization and conviction, but only on the local level. Sometimes they gain 
the political office of a village mayor. Mayan ethnic intellectuals (e.g. Rigoberta 
Menchú or Vitalino Similox) mobilize the public for national politics and have run for 
political office. They act on the level of national political parties. Twice the Neo-
Pentecostal religious transnational project gained the highest office in government: 
once through the dictatorship of Efraín Rios Montt (1982-83) and once through the 
electoral victory of Jorge Serrano Elias (1991-93). The former, as a dictator, never had 
much public support; the latter lost his initial support as he compromised his integrity 
through corruption. It is important to note that in Latin America and the USA the 
political field is stable enough for parties to function as institutional “filters” between 
mass mobilization and public office. It is this potential to unite ethnic and partisan 
mobilization that makes, in Bolivia, the case of Evo Morales unique.  
The influence of external factors on the political field reflects the systemic com-
promise of democracy by pre-election promises: often those who make the biggest 
promises get elected (says Plato). Nevertheless, the conversion of public recognition 
into political mobilization and then into political capital (prestige) is the way in which 
identity issues manifest themselves in the political field. It is the “public fringe” of the 
political field (the right and the lower rims of the model in fig. 2) where social move-
ments and especially identity movements act. Newcomers enter the field from the 
“fringe” and introduce changes. Hence, the processes of converting different symbolic 
and social currencies into political capital are among the most important objectives of 
research on identity politics. Having determined the position of a given actor within 
the field, we can study the effects exerted by, for example, transnational ties, media 
ownership, communication skills, or the implementation or invention of identity-shap-
ing symbols in literature, film, music, pictorial and performing arts have on the po-
sition of the actor in the political field. In other words, we can study how and to what 
extent identity-oriented practices are able to redefine the relevant content in the 
political field and to strengthen the ability of a given actor to achieve a dominant posi-
tion.  
This task reminds us that any position in the political field is not only a specific 
point within the objective relations of power, but conveys a certain habitus of the 
corresponding actors. Field and habitus are co-dependent—but not in the essentialist 
and reifying way in which the concept of habitus is frequently misunderstood. A 
habitus—as an open, minimally structured set of cognitive, affective and bodily 
dispositions for perception, judgment and action—spawns strategies of discourse and 
action. Those strategies follow a practical logic and can be found in all the cultural 
practices and products of a given actor. The Neo-Pentecostal project of transnational 
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neoliberal religious identity politics, for example, is anchored in religious convictions 
such as these: indigenous religion and indigenous people are possessed by demons; 
Neo-Pentecostals are the only legitimate representatives of God and His Spirit; God 
grants material prosperity to honest believers; the nation has to be healed by exorcism; 
the North Atlantic Protestant model of culture is the most appropriate for Guatemala. 
This leads to dropping Napalm bombs on Indian villages and to treating alcoholics by 
casting out demons, dismissing social policies by stating that poor people do not wor-
ship the right God.  
The model shows that Neo-Pentecostal identity politics at some point (1991, in 
the case of Serrano) achieved an optimal position on the political field. But it does not 
show to what extent identity strategies have contributed to it. Another model has to 
locate the actors according to the type and combination of their strategies.  
6. Identity Strategies 
The concept of “identity strategies” seems to be an oxymoron—at least if it is under-
stood on the background of the long-standing antithesis between social theories of 
macro-structure and micro-action, such as Marxist structuralism (e.g., Althusser) vs. 
Rational Choice theory (e.g., Homans). In the theory of social and religious move-
ments this juxtaposition of approaches corresponds to a more specific antithesis: the 
“New Social Movements Theory” (NSM), identity-oriented and of European origin 
(e.g., Melcucci) vs. the “Resource Mobilization Theory” (RMT), strategy-oriented and 
of U.S. American origin (e.g., Zald).16 Up to a certain point, this distinction is homol-
ogous to the one between culture- and class-oriented movements17 discussed in the 
context of the indigenous revival in the Americas since the seventies18 or to the dis-
tinction between “identity politics” and “interest politics” in the frame of research on 
                                                
16  Cf. a classic appraisal in Cohen, “Strategy or Identity” and an overview of the most im-
portant authors in Rucht, Research on Social Movements. 
17  Cf. Eder et al, Collective Identities in Action and Eder, “Die Zukunft sozialer Bewegungen 
zwischen Identitätspolitik und politischem Unternehmertum.” 
18  It is important to note that one of the most influential events at the start of the inter-
nationally noticeable indigenous movement was an initiative of the World Council of 
Churches, Geneva—a very important ecumenical body for worldwide issues of justice and 
peace, whose knowledgeable interventions in public affairs are notoriously ignored by the 
social sciences. The event was the 1971 Barbados Conference of Indigenous and Church 
leaders and anthropologists, originally criticizing the Christian missionary movement. For 
the Barbados I Document, cf. Bonfil, “Barbados”; for the WCC participation see “World 
Council of Churches: Indigenous People;” for background, cf. Bonfil, Indianidad y de-
colonización en América Latina (historical) and Speiser, “Indigene Völker und 
internationale Zusammenarbeit” (recent); for the new role of religion in identity politics, 
see Cleary/Steigenga, Resurgent Voices in Latin America. For social science and other 
publications from the perspective of the indigenous movement on the web, see http://www. 
abyayala.org/index.php. 
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creating peace (Rothman/Olson), well aware that the logics of “interest politics” are 
more compatible with Rational Choice.  
We cannot discuss this issue here. For us it is important to note that the sociology 
of Pierre Bourdieu bridges the gap between the schools of theory intentionally and 
effectively, since it is interested in both actors and structures. Using Bourdieu’s frame-
work in a proper way, identity and strategy can be conceived of as two faces of the 
same coin. His theory integrates the opposition between “structure versus action” as 
well as the one between “value-oriented action versus rational action” (Weber) into 
one frame and facilitates the development of corresponding methods. Finally, in social 
movement studies, the approaches regarding mobilization as provoked by grievances 
and opportunities respectively can also be integrated in this theoretical framework, 
thus enabling us to interpret data in both ways. It is this integration which makes it 
possible to distinguish different types of action or strategies within one coherent 
framework without separating them. Thus, we can adopt the distinction between, on 
the one hand, class- or interest-oriented strategies and, on the other, culture- or 
identity-oriented strategies in order to project both within one model. This allows lo-
cating strategies of given actors within a field of strategic alternatives according to 
their proximity to the pole of “culture” or “class;” in other words, of “being” and 
“having” or of identity and material goals.  
However, we should be clear about the fact that this model does not focus on 
political positions and the capital of given actors (as the former did), but on the strate-
gies the actors employ. Whether these strategies lead to achievements, may be dis-
cussed in comparison with the models of the political field and of the social space of 
political styles. No model shows everything at the same time; models simply support 
the interpretative task of social sciences.  
According to the distinction between strategies located in culture or in class we 
construct the model with a “class” axis and a “status” axis.19 The vertical axis repre-
sents the focus of a given strategy on market opportunities and, thus, on (economic) 
achievement, while the horizontal axis represents the focus of a strategy on the affir-
mation of the actor’s particular identity and, thus, on his (cultural) autonomy. In terms 
of political strategies, the axes represent different types of how actors render their 
goals plausible to a wider public (in order to gain political capital). Accordingly, the 
vertical axis represents arguments oriented in interest and of an inclusive kind. (“We 
have an interest in participating in political decisions and as co-citizens we have a right 
to do so.”) The horizontal axis represents the use of identity-oriented and exclusivist 
arguments. (“Because we are indigenous people, who have been oppressed for a long 
time, we have the right to special conditions of participation.”) The two axes permit 
the construction of a two-dimensional model. 
                                                
19  Those two axes cannot quite be said to reflect the theories of Weber and Marx: both of 
them take both axes into account. One could think, drawing on Hegel and Marx, of the 
class axis as representing the actors “in themselves” and the status axis as representing the 
actors “for themselves.”  
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Figure 3: Types of Strategy 
It can be asked, however, why we do not simply establish a linear continuum 
between “class” and “status” and conceive of these two strategic focuses as inversely 
co-variant: while class orientation increases, status orientation decreases. This could be 
done. But a two-dimensional model facilitates more interpretative depth. There are at 
least two benefits. First, if we conceive of the increase of either orientation (class and 
identity) along with the increase of intensity of the corresponding conviction, the diag-
onal between zero and maximum of both (lower left to upper right, fig. 3) shows the 
“ideological load” of certain strategies (high position) versus a pragmatic openness of 
strategies (low position). If it has a high ideological load, a strategy is fought vigorous-
ly and is hard to change; with a low one, pragmatic adaptation is easier. Second, a 
strategy located near the diagonal can be understood as rather inclusive, since it com-
bines elements of status and class orientation.  
As we cannot yet provide scales for measuring these values,20 it is all the more 
important to establish a set of criteria to distinguish between the two types of strategies 
and to estimate a proper location for any actor/strategy observed within the model:  
First, it is a good idea to define both identity and interest politics as means to 
achieve an objective. Second, the objective itself might broadly be defined as maxi-
                                                
20  In case of the model of the religious field used in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we have such scales 
and already used the model successfully in a survey.  
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mum control over public goods such as, e.g., the access to natural, economic and 
social resources as well as social reputation, political representation and influence, se-
cure livelihood and so forth. In relation to the political field only, the goal is, of course, 
dominance. Third, identity-oriented strategies tend to lead to arguments (ethnic, 
religious or gender-related) that foster the interests of a defined group and operate 
through the exclusion of others. Strategies oriented in mere material goals tend to 
employ arguments (without necessarily following universalist interests!) that include 
as many actors as possible under the umbrella of their interest. Fourth, since identity-
based strategies put the selfhood of the actor at stake, they are harder to negotiate and 
tend to combine with more violent conflicts (such as ethnic cleansing) than strategies 
open to market opportunities. Fifth, identity politics bear more risk than interest poli-
tics. Thus, mobilization is more probable as a last resort if actors do not see any other 
possibilities of participating in the political game. 
We finally return to the example of the Guatemalan actors (fig. 3). Let me first 
mark two ideal-typical extreme positions in the model: the completely class-oriented 
Social Democratic Party and, on the other extreme, the ethnic or religious sect con-
ceiving of itself as the chosen people. Applying the model to the ethnic religious actors 
analyzed by Andrea Althoff, we can see that Neo-Pentecostals and Mayan intellectuals 
both use encompassing strategies. The movements affirm both status and class orien-
tation strongly on the level of national politics, with the Mayan intellectuals focusing 
somewhat more on identity and the Neo-Pentecostals emphasizing market opportuni-
ties. The indigenous Pentecostals seem to combine interest and identity strategies as 
well, but with a much lower ideological profile and with more pragmatic flexibility in 
their communities.  
7. Combining the Views 
No one model can explain everything. Thus, each of our three heuristic models adopts 
only one perspective on a complex and multi-faceted social praxis. The first step back 
from reduction to complexity is to interpret the positions of the actors in all three 
models simultaneously. I will briefly sketch this step, using the Guatemalan Neo-Pen-
tecostal example.  
In the strategy model (fig. 3) we can see that Neo-Pentecostals operate with a 
peculiar mix of identity- and class-oriented strategies that are highly ideological and 
socially exposed. They combine two strategy types employing the promise of individu-
al prosperity as the mobilizing symbol, which also marks the neoliberal bias of the 
movement. At the same time, the realization of prosperity is said to be dependent on 
the power that the Spirit of God subjectively infuses into each true believer—and only 
into believers. In comparison to the Mayan intellectuals’ strategy, the Neo-Pentecostal 
one is less dependent on objective (ethnic) belonging and therefore easier to project 
onto universalistic strategies of market opportunity—while nevertheless being based 
on religious identity. Moreover, its neoliberal focus on individual prosperity at least in 
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the 1990s coincides more with the overall societal trend towards individual progress. 
During the 1980s, the overall project of Neo-Pentecostal identity politics was symbol-
ized by the discursive operator of “spiritual warfare” of the saints against the demons 
of guerrilla, indigenous revolt, labor unions, Marxism etc., which was projected onto 
official politics. Later on, during the 90s, in Neo-Pentecostalism the symbol of “heal-
ing”—anchored in the ritual practice of faith healing—became more important and 
was projected onto politics as the program of “healing the nation.”21 The religious 
symbols of “spiritual warfare” and “healing” thus function strategically as practical 
metaphors to translate religious content into political discourse and into the capacity of 
mobilization—a process of semiotic and capital conversion on the “public fringe” of 
the political field. Those strategies, based upon social metaphoric operations, seem to 
me very important in understanding the role of cultural production for political 
mobilization within the frame of a theory of identity politics.  
Through social metaphoric conversion the symbols of “spiritual warfare” and of 
“healing” find their way as a mobilizing discourse into the power constellations of the 
political field (fig. 2). Both are associated right away with a position of achievement 
above the barrier of political parties. During the 1980s, the “spiritual warfare” scheme 
colluded with the legitimizing discourse of a dictatorial counterinsurgency regime. The 
idea of exorcising political enemies, thus, gave a special connotation of Christian iden-
tity politics to counterinsurgency measures—especially as they hit “devilish Indians” 
and “atheist Marxists.” Ten years later, the idea of healing a wounded nation through 
Christian faith and truth accompanied the election campaign of Jorge Serrano Elias 
and part of his time in office—until the corruption affairs and dictatorial measures 
began. In any case, Neo-Pentecostal identity politics in the political field of Guatemala 
can be seen as quite closely related to positions of relatively high political achievement 
and, thus, not all too dependent on public mobilization.  
Finally, a short glimpse at the model of the social space of political styles (fig. 1) 
shows that Neo-Pentecostals, during the 80s and 90s, had their social base in the mod-
ernizing sectors of the upper middle class. This observation allows us to interpret the 
strategies of the movement and its position in the field of politics as specific to a social 
class with sufficient resources (money, education, time and transnational connections) 
for political action and sufficiently good perspectives for overcoming the crisis and at 
least maintaining its position as a class. The symbols of Neo-Pentecostal identity pol-
itics—“spiritual warfare” and “healing the nation”—thus appear as semantic instruments 
of social power-broking and as linkages in an intimate combination between identity 
politics and class politics in an upwardly mobile and quite powerful social position.  
Finally, the combination of the three models—space, field, and strategies—can 
guide a careful comparative interpretation of identity-based politics within the wider 
frame of political power-broking and social structure. The objectivistic description of 
actors and strategies provides a framework for an in-depth analysis of the actor’s 
                                                
21  On the use of this and other symbols in actual religious identity politics in Latin America, 
cf. Cleary/Steigenga, Resurgent Voices in Latin America.  
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identities (as briefly referred to in the chapter on identity). This can be done through a 
“habitus analysis”22 applied to discourse, film, the press, rites etc. of the collective 
actors involved. It shows the deep operational schemes behind the actors’ practical 
logic. The models of space, field and strategies then, in turn, help to understand the 
objective conditions within which the identity-based operations achieve their special 
meaning—thus completing a meaningful analysis of identity politics. 
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